康德即萨德

springhero 2011-12-24 15:48:00

springhero
2011-12-24 15:50:40 springhero

Kant with Sade 02
康德即萨德

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

Let us consider the paradox that it is at the very moment at which the subject no longer has any object before him that he encounters a law that has no other phenomenon than something that is already signifying; the latter is obtained from a voice in conscience, which, articulating in the form of a maxim in conscience, proposes the order of a purely practical reason or will there.

让我们考虑一下这个矛盾:就在这个时刻,生命主体的面前不再拥有任何的客体,他遭遇到一个法则,这个法则没有其它现象,除了就是某件能指化的东西。 后者被获得,从良心的一个声音。这个声音以某种的个性习性的方式在良心里表达, 建议在那里的纯粹实践理性与意志的秩序。

For this maxim to constitute a law, it is necessary and sufficient that, being
put to the test of such reason, the maxim may be considered universal as far as
logic is concerned.

为了要这个个人习性建构法则,就逻辑而言,它有需要,也充分足够被认为是普遍性, 当它接受如此理性的考验时。

This does not mean—let us recall what "logic" entails—that it forces itself on everyone, but rather that it is valid in every case or, better stated, that it is not valid in any case if it is not valid in every case.

这并不意味着—让我们回忆一下「逻辑」涵盖什麽—这个个人习性强迫它自己在每个人身上。而是, 它在每个个案,都是有效的。或者,说得更加恰当些, 假如它无法在每个个案有效,它就在任何个案,都无效。

But this test, which must be based on pure, though practical, reason, can
only be passed by maxims of the type that allows for analytic deduction.

但是这个考验,建立的基础必须是纯粹,虽然是实践的理性, 只有藉由考虑到分析推理的这种习性, 它才能被传递。

This type is illustrated by the faithfulness required in returning a deposit:3
we can get some shut-eye after making a deposit knowing that the depositary
must remain blind to any condition that would oppose this faithfulness. In
other words, there is no deposit without a depositary worthy of his task.

这种习性的说明例子是;当它回报一个储存时, 要求忠实。我们能够保持盲目,对于任何跟这种忠诚相反的情况。换句话说, 每个储存必然包括值得这个工作的储存物。

One can sense the need for a more synthetic foundation, even in such an
obvious case. At the risk of some irreverence, let me, in turn, illustrate the
flaw in it with a maxim by Father Ubu that I have modified slightly: "Long
live Poland, for if there were no Poland, there would be no Poles."

我们能够感觉这种需要,为了充当综合的基础,甚至在一个明显的个案。 冒着某种不尊敬的结果,轮到让我使用武布父亲的个人习性,说明里面的这个瑕疵,我曾经稍作修改: “ 波兰万岁!因为假如每有波澜, 就没有波澜人。”

Let no one, out of some slowness of wit or emotivity, doubt my attachment
to a freedom without which the people mourn. But while the analytic
explanation of it here is irrefutable, its indefectibility is tempered by the
observation that the Poles have always been known for their remarkable
resistance to the eclipses of Poland, and even to the lamentation that ensued.

请不要有人因为机智或感情的迟钝,怀疑我争取自由的情感,假如没有自由, 人们会哀伤不己。但是虽然在此有精神分析对它的解释,是无可反驳的,它的没有缺点稍有损伤, 由于这个观察: 波兰人总是以他们的抗拒波兰被贬低著名,甚至导致随后被併吞的哀伤。

We encounter anew here what led Kant to express his regret that no intuition
offers up a phenomenal object in the experience of the moral law.

我们在此重新遭遇康德被引导表达他的遗憾:在道德法则的经验, 没有直觉提供一个巨大的客体。

I agree that this object slips away throughout the Critique. But it can be surmised in the trace left by the implacable suite Kant provides to demonstrate its slipping away, from which the work derives an eroticism that is no doubt innocent, but perceptible, the well-foundedness of which I shall show through the nature of the said object

我同意, 这个客体从「实践理性批判」里溜走掉。但是我们能够推测,从康德供应的那套严谨的体系,留下的痕迹,为了证明它的溜走掉。 从那里, 这个工作获得一些无可置疑的纯真,但是可感觉到的情爱。透过以上所说的客体, 我将会显示,这个情爱的稳固基础。

This is why I will ask those of my readers who are still virgins with respect to the Critique, never having read it, to stop reading my text here and to return to it after perusing Kant's. Let them see if it does, indeed, have the effect I say it does. In any case, I promise them the pleasure that is brought by the feat itself.

这就是为什么我将会问我的那些读者,对于「实践理性批判」,他们仅是初次接触,因为以前没有阅读过。我要去他们不要阅读我在此的文本,而要先翻阅康德的文本后,再回到这里。 让他们明白, 假如它是否真的有我说的它具有的这个效果。无论如何, 我承诺他们往还阅读会带个他们无穷乐趣。

The other readers will follow me now into Philosophy in the Bedroom, at least into the reading thereof.

其它的读者现在将跟随我们探索「床上哲学」,至少进入对它的阅读。

It proves to be a pamphlet, but a dramatic one, in which the stage lighting allows the dialogue and the action to be taken to the very limits of what is imaginable. The lights go dark for a moment to make room for a diatribe—a sort of pamphlet within the pamphlet—entitled "Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, If You Would Become Republicans."

那证明是一本小册子,但是非常精彩。在里面, 舞台灯光容许对话及活动,被带到难于想象的极限。 灯光暗淡一下子,是为了让人有责骂的空间---这一种书册里的小册子---题名是:「再努力一次,法国人,假如你想要成为共和党人!」

What is enunciated in it is ordinarily understood, if not appreciated, as a
mystification. One need not be alerted to the fact that a dream within a dream
points to a closer relationship to the real to see an indication of the same kind
in the text's deriding of the historical situation. It is blatant and one would do
well to look twice at the text.

里面所表述的内容一般人即可了解, 即使没有受到赞赞,作为一种令人迷惑的口号。 我们不需要对有所警觉于这个事实:梦中之梦指向跟真是界有更密切的关系,我们才能明白相同种类的啟示,对于这个文本在历情境里的嘲讽。 这是显而易见的,我们最好对文本再看第二遍。

The crux of the diatribe is, let us say, found in the maxim that proposes a
rule for jouissance, which is odd in that it defers to Kant's mode in being laid
down as a universal rule. Let us enunciate the maxim:

谴责的要点是, 让我们说,在这个箴言里被找到. 这个箴言建议一种欢爽的原则, 这个欢爽的原则是古怪的,因为它听从康德的模式,被制定作为一个普遍性的原则。让我们表述这个箴言:

"I have the right to enjoy your body," anyone can say to me, "and I will
exercise this right without any limit to the capriciousness of the exactions
I may wish to satiate with your body."

「我有权利享用你的身体,」任何人能够对我说,「我将会运用这个权利,用你的身体,我可以希望满足强取豪夺,没有任何限制。」

Such is the rule to which everyone 's will would be submitted, assuming a
society were to forcibly implement the rule.

这个原则是如此,以致假如一个社会想要强迫实行这条原则, 每个人都意志将会屈从它。

To any reasonable being, both the maxim and the consent assumed to be
given it are at best an instance of black humor.

对于任何有理性的人, 箴言与被认为给予它的认同,充其量是冷嘲热讽的例子。

But aside from the fact that if the deductions in the Critique prepared us for
anything, it is for distinguishing the rational from the sort of reasonable that
is no more than resorting in a confused fashion to the pathological, we now
know that humor betrays the very function of the "superego" in comedy.

但是除了这个事实: 假如「实践理性批判」里的推论,让我们心里有所准备, 因为它可用来区别一般理性,与这个仅是以混淆方式诉诸于不受经验沾染到理性。我们现在知道, 冷嘲热讽显示出「超我」在喜剧中的功用。

A fact that—to bring this psychoanalytic agency to life by instantiating it and
to wrest it from the renewed obscurantism of our contemporaries' use of it—
can also spice up [relever] the Kantian test of the universal rule with the grain
of salt it is missing.

这个事实---它具体地活生生地表现精神分析的代理,从现代人对它的使用,重新呈现的蒙眛主义,把它夺取出来—这个事实让康德的普遍性原则的考验,漏失滋味后,有让人興味盎然。

Are we not thus incited to take more seriously what is presented to us as
not entirely serious? As you may well suspect, I will not ask if it is necessary or sufficient that a society sanction a right to jouissance, by permitting everyone
to lay claim to it, for its maxim to thus be legitimated by the imperative
of moral law.

我们难道不是被激起要更加认真看待,所被呈现给我们的东西, 作为并不完全认真? 你们很有理由怀疑, 我将不问是否这是需要或充分, 一个社会认同一种欢爽的权利, 让每个人宣称它, 为了让它的个人习性被合理化,由于拥有道德法则的命令。


No de facto legality can decide if this maxim can assume the rank of a universal
rule, since this rank may also possibly oppose it to all de facto legalities.
This is not a question that can be settled simply by imagining it, and the
extension of the right that the maxim invokes to everyone is not what is at
issue here.

事实上,没有一种立法能够决定, 是否这个个人习性具有普遍性的原则的地位。因为这个地位也可能将它与所有的实际上的立法相对立。 我们仅是想像它,并无法解决这个问题,这个个人习性对于每个召唤的权利的延伸,并不是在此要讨论的问题。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http://springhero.wordpress.com

springhero
2011-12-24 15:51:20 springhero

Kant with Sade 03
康德即萨德

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

At best one could demonstrate here the mere possibility of generalizability,
which is not universality; the latter considers things as they are grounded and not as they happen to work out.

充其量,我们在此能够证明,一般化的可能性,并非是普遍化。后者考虑事情,是根据他们的基础,而不是根据他们偶然的奇遇。

I cannot pass up the opportunity to point out the exorbitant nature of the
role people grant to the moment of reciprocity in structures, especially subjective
ones, that are intrinsically incompatible with reciprocity.

我们错过这个机会来指出,在结构互惠的时刻,人们给予过高的角色属性,特别是主观性的属性。那在本质上是跟互惠不相容的。

Reciprocity—a relation that is reversible since it is established along a
simple line that unites two subjects who, due to their "reciprocal" position,
consider this relation to be equivalent—is difficult to situate as the logical
time of any sort of breakthrough [franchissement] on the subject's part in his
relation to the signifier, and far less still as a step in any sort of development,
whether or not it can be considered psychical (in which it is always so con
venient to blame the child when providing veneers with a pedagogical intent).

互惠—这一层可倒转的关系,因为它被建立,沿着一条简单的线,统合两个生命主体, 由于他们「互惠」的立场。考虑一下这个关系的平等性---互惠很难定位,作为任何种类突破的逻辑的时间,在生命主体这一方面,由于他跟能指的关系。 更不适合充当任何发展的步骤,无论它是否被认为是心理的发展 (在这种发展里, 要责怪小孩非常方便, 以教导的意图作为掩饰。)

Be that as it may, we can already credit our maxim with serving as a paradigm
for a statement that as such excludes reciprocity (reciprocity and not
"my turn next time").

不管是怎样的情况,我们已经是在推崇我们的个人习性,以充当一个陈述的典范。这个陈述的本身排除互惠 ( 是互惠,而不是「下次轮到我」)

Any judgment regarding the odious social order that would enthrone our
maxim is, thus, of no import here, for the question is whether to grant or
refuse to grant this maxim the characteristic of a rule acceptable as universal
in moral philosophy—moral philosophy being recognized, since Kant's
time, as involving the unconditional practice of reason.

关于这个令人厌恶的社会秩序,它推崇我们的个人习性, 因此任何判断,在此是没有意义的。因为这个问题是要不要给予或拒绝给予这个个习性,在道德哲学上,可接受作为普遍性的规则的特性---因为在康德的时代,道德哲学被体认,作为牵涉到理性的无条件实践。

We must obviously acknowledge this characteristic in the maxim for the
simple reason that its sole proclamation (its kerygma) has the virtue of instating
both the radical rejection of the pathological (that is, of every preoccupation
with goods, passion, or even compassion—in other words, the rejection by
which Kant cleared the field of moral law) and the form of this law, which is
also its only substance, insofar as the will becomes bound to the law only by
eliminating from its practice every reason that is not based on the maxim itself.

我们必须显而易见地承认个人习性的这个特性。理由很简单, 它的唯一的宣布,拥有这个优点: 安置对于未被经验沾染到积极拒绝( 也就是, 每一件专注于善, 激情,或甚至同情---换句话说, 憑著这个拒绝, 康德清理道德法则的领域),这个法则的形式, 也是它唯一的本质, 只有当从法则的实践里,减少每个不是根据习性本身的理由,意志才变得跟法则连繫在一起。

Of course, these two imperatives—between which moral life can be stretched, even if it snaps our very life—are imposed on us, according to the Sadean paradox, as if upon the Other, and not upon ourselves.

当然, 这两个命令---在它们之间, 道德的生命能够被延伸,即使它折断我们的生命---这两个命令赋加在我们身上,依照萨德的矛盾律, 好像赋加在大它者身上,而不是赋加在我们身上。

But this only differs from Kant's view at first blush, for the moral imperative latently does no less, since its commandment requisitions us as Other.
但是这仅是表面上跟康德的观点不同,因为道德命令潜在做同等的事, 因为它的命令要求我们作为大它者。

We perceive quite nakedly here what the aforementioned parody of the obvious universality of the depositary's duty was designed to introduce us to—namely, that the bipolarity upon which the moral law is founded is nothing but the split [refente] in the subject brought about by any and every intervention of the signifier: the split between the enunciating subject [sujet de I'enonciation] and the subject of the statement [sujet de I'enonce], The moral law has no other principle.

我们在此相对坦诚地感觉到,前面提到的这个储存物的责任显而易见的普遍化,是一种讽刺模仿,它被设计用来跟我们介绍—也就是说, 道德赖以建立的两极,仅仅就是生命主体的分裂,由于能指的任何介入及每次介入所导致: 表述主体与被被陈述主体的分裂。 道德法则没有其它原则。

Yet it must be blatant, for otherwise it lends itself to the mystification we sense in the gag* "Long live Poland!"

可是, 它一定是很公然的。因为否则在诸如「波兰万岁!」这样的玩笑口号,这种分裂会有助于我们感觉到的神秘化。

In coming out of the Other's mouth, Sade's maxim is more honest than Kant's appeal to the voice within, since it unmasks the split in the subject that is usually covered up.

当萨德的个人习性,从大它者的嘴巴里讲出时,比康德的诉诸于内在的声音更加坦诚,因为它揭发通常被掩盖的主体的分裂。

The enunciating subject stands out here as clearly as in "Long live Poland," where the only thing that sticks out is what its manifestation amusingly evokes.

表述的主体在此清楚地突显出来,如同在「波兰万岁!」。在那里, 仅有突显出来的事情,是它的证明有趣地地在召唤的东西。

To confirm this view, one need but consider the doctrine with which Sade
himself establishes the reign of his principle: the doctrine of human rights.

为了证实这个观点,我们仅仅需要考虑这个信条,萨德自己用来建立他的原则的统治的信条: 人权的信条。

He cannot use the notion that no man can be the property, or in any way the
prerogative, of another man as a pretext for suspending everyone's right to
enjoy him, each in his own way.4

他无法使用这个观念: 不能把人当财产,或是没有人能够对另外一个人拥有特权,作为悬置每个人享受他的权利,每个人都以他自己的方式。

The constraint he endures here is not so much one of violence as of principle, the problem for the person who makes it into a sentence not being so much to make another man consent to it as to pronounce it in his place.

他在此忍受的约束,与其说是暴力的约束,不然说是原则的约束。成功地进入判决的这个人的问题,与其说是要使另外一个人同意它,不如说是要代替他宣判它。

Thus the discourse of the right to jouissance clearly posits the Other qua free—the Other's freedom—as its enunciating subject, in a way that does not differ from the Tu es which is evoked out of the lethal depths [fonds tuant] of every imperative.

因此,欢爽权利的论述,清楚地提出大它者作为自由—大它者的自由---作为它表述的主体, 用的方式跟在每个命令的致命深处召唤出来的「Tues」没有什么不同。

But this discourse is no less determinant for the subject of the statement, giving rise to him with each addressing of its equivocal content: since jouissance, shamelessly avowed in its very purpose, becomes one pole in a couple, the other pole being in the hole that jouissance already drills in the Other's locus in order to erect the cross of Sadean experience in it.

但是论述同样是决定性,对于这个被表述的主体,用它的模棱两可的内容的每次称谓,产生他: 因为欢爽,毫无羞愧地被承认它的目的, 变成配对中的其中一个极端,另外一端则是处于欢爽在大它者的轨迹鑽出的空洞里,为了竖立萨的在里面的十字架。

Leaving off my discussion of its mainspring here, let me recall instead that pain, which projects its promise of ignominy here, merely intersects the express mention of it made by Kant among the connotations of moral experience.

当我停止我在此对它的动力的讨论, 代替的,让我们回顾一下:痛苦投射它的羞辱的承诺, 在此仅是与康德在道德经验的内涵的生动的表达交会。

What pain is worth in Sadean experience will be seen better by approaching it via what might be disconcerting in the artifice the Stoics used with regard to it: scorn

在萨德的经验里,痛苦的价值,将会被看得更加清楚,当他经由禁欲学派使用对于痛苦的巧计里, 令人狼狈的东西,来接近它。那就是: 藐视。

Imagine a revival of Epictetus in Sadean experience: "You see, you broke it," he says, pointing to his leg. To reduce jouissance to the misery of an effect in which one's quest stumbles—doesn't this transform it into disgust?

想像伊壁鸠鲁哲学在萨德经验里的复興: 「你瞧,你打断它,」他说, 指著他的脚。 为了要将欢爽减化成为情感的悲惨,在里面,我们的追寻绊倒---这难道不是将它转变成厌恶?

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http://springhero.wordpress.com


springhero
2011-12-26 11:44:43 springhero

Kant with Sade 02
康德即萨德

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

This shows that jouissance is that by which Sadean experience is modified.
For it only proposes to monopolize a will after having already traversed it in
order to instate itself at the inmost core of the subject whom it provokes
beyond that by offending his sense of modesty [pudeur].

这显示,欢爽是萨德的经验藉以被修改的东西。 因为它仅是提议要笼断一个意志, 在它已经全面研究它之后,为了要安置它自己在主题的最内层核心。 它挑激主体超越那个核心, 以冒犯他的稳重感。

For modesty is an amboceptor with respect to the circumstances of being:
between the two, the one's immodesty by itself violating the other's modesty.
A connection that could justify, were such justification necessary, what I said
before regarding the subject's assertion in the Other's place.

因为稳重感是一种溶血素,关于生命实存的情境。在两者之间, 一个人的不稳重本身,扰乱另一人的稳重。 若有需要证明,有一个关联能够证明我所说能够成立,关于主体代替大它者所作的主张。

Let us question this jouissance, which is precarious because it depends on
an echo that it sets off in the Other, only to abolish it little by little by attaching
the intolerable to it. In the end, doesn't it seem to us to be thrilled only by
itself, like another horrible freedom?

让我们质疑这个欢爽, 这是不稳定的欢爽, 因为它依靠它在大它者身上触发的一种回响,结果逐渐给予它无法被忍受的东西,而废除它。最后, 仅是它的本身, 就像另外一个可怕的自由, 难道不是似乎会使我们感到興奋?

Thus we will see appear the third term that, according to Kant, is lacking
in moral experience—namely, the object that Kant, in order to guarantee it to
the will in the implementation of the Law, is constrained to relegate to the
unthinkability of the thing in itself. But is this not the very object we find in
Sadean experience, which is no longer inaccessible and is instead revealed as
the being-in-the-world, the Dasein^ of the tormenting agent?

因此,我们将会看到第三个术语出现,依照康德, 那就是道德经验的欠缺—也就是说, 康德不得不分配给真实界本身的不可思议性的客体, 为了保证它给予使用法则的意志。 但是这并不是我们在萨德的经验里找到的这个客体。这个客体不再能被接近, 代替的,它被显示作为世界里的生命实存, 折磨代理人的生命实存。

Yet it retains the opacity of that which is transcendent. For this object is strangely separated from the subject. Let us observe that the herald of the maxim need be no more here than a point of broadcast. It could be a voice on the radio recalling the right promoted by the supplemental effort the French would have consented to make in response to Sade's appeal, the maxim having become an organic Law of their regenerated Republic.

可是, 它保留超验的内容的模糊性。 因为这个客体很奇怪地跟生命主体分开。 让我们观察,个人习性的宣布,在此道道地地是一个广播点。 它会像是收音机的一个声音,提醒法国人本来会同意去做辅助的努力以提升的权利,在回应萨德的诉求, 这个个人习性已经成为他们重生动共和国的有机法则。

Such voice-related phenomena, especially those found in psychosis, truly have this object-like appearance. And in its early days, psychoanalysis was not very far from relating the voice of conscience to psychosis.

诸如跟声音有关的现象, 特别是那些在精神病患身上被找到的那些现象, 确实拥有这个像客体一般的表象。 在它早期的日子, 精神分析差不多就是将良心的声音跟精神病联想在一起。

Here we see why Kant views this object as evading every determination of
transcendental aesthetics, even though it does not fail to appear in a certain
bulge in the phenomenal veil, being not without hearth or home, time in intuition,
modality situated in the unreal [irreel], or effect in reality. It is not simply
that Kant's phenomenology is lacking here, but that the voice—even if
insane—forces [upon us] the idea of the subject, and that the object of the law
must not suggest malignancy on the part of the real God.

在此,我们看到, 为什么康德看待这个客体,当著是逃避超验美学的每个决定,即使它一定会以某种的突起出现在现象界的面纱, 因为它并不是每有火炉或家园。在直觉中的时间, 它的形式被定位在非真实界, 或在现实界的情感。 不仅是因为康德的现象学在此是欠缺, 而且那个声音---即使是疯狂, 会将主体的观念强迫在我们身上。法律的客体一定不要建议说, 它是真实上帝的恶意。

Christianity has assuredly taught men to pay little attention to God's jouissance, and this is how Kant makes palatable his voluntarism of Law-for- Law's-sake, which is something that exaggerates, one might say, the ataraxia of the Stoics.

基督教确实教人不要太注意上帝的欢爽。这就是为什么康德让他的志愿者的为了法则而法则的志愿者,那么讨人喜爱的地方。我们不妨说, 它是某件誇张力禁欲学派的「安详」。

One might be tempted to think that Kant feels pressured here by what he hears too close by, not from Sade but from some nearby mystic, in the sigh that muffles what he glimpses beyond, having seen that his God is faceless: Grimmigkeit? Sade says: supremely-evil-being.

我们可能会被引诱去认为,康德在此感觉有压力,由于太靠近听到的东西, 不是从萨德听到,而是从某个附近的神秘主体听到,在错过他所瞥见的东西的讯息里,因为他曾经看见,他的上帝是没有面貌的:Grimmigkeit ? 萨德说: 崇高的邪恶之神。

But humph! Schwarmereien, black swarms—I chase you away in order to
return to the function of presence in the Sadean fantasy.

但是,哼! 这些黑色的虫群---我总是追逐你们,为了回到萨德的幻见到存在的功能。

This fantasy has a structure that we will see again further on; in it the object is but one of the terms in which the quest it figures can die out [s'eteindre].

这个幻见拥有一个结构,我们随后将会再次看到, 在它里面, 这个客体仅是其中一个术语,它所扮演的追寻会逐渐消失。

When jouissance petrifies in the object, it becomes the black fetish, in which can be recognized the form that was verily and truly offered up at a certain time and place, and still is in our own time, so that one can adore the god therein.

在这个客体身上,欢爽惊呆时,它变成黑色的物神。在里面, 我们能够体认到这个形式:它道道地地是在某个时间及某个地方,在我们的时代,依旧被提供的形式。这样,我们能够崇拜这个内在的神。

This is what becomes of the executioner in sadism when, in the most extreme case, his presence is reduced to being no more than the instrument.

这就是在虐待狂里, 行刑者的遭遇。在最极端的情况里,他的存在被还原成为仅是一种工具。

But the fact that the executioner's jouissance becomes fixated there does not spare his jouissance the humility of an act in which he cannot help but become a being of flesh and, to the very marrow, a slave to pleasure.

但是,行刑者的欢爽变成固定,这个事实并没有替他的欢爽,减免行动的卑下。 在行动里,他身不由己地成为一个肉体的生命实存。 追根究底来说,就是欢乐的奴隶。

This duplication neither reflects nor reciprocates (why wouldn't it "mutualize"?) the duplication that took place in the Other owing to the subject's two alterities.

这种复制既没有反射,也没有互惠。 ( 何不说是「彼此利用」?)这个复制发生在大它者,由于生命主体具有两个大它者。

Desire—which is the henchman of the subject's split—would no doubt be willing to call itself "will to jouissance." But this appellation would not make desire any more worthy of the will it invokes in the Other, in tempting that will [to go right] to the extreme of its division from its pathos; for when it does so, desire departs [part] beaten down, doomed to impotence.

欲望---是生命主体的分裂的忠实追随者---无可置疑地愿意称它自己是「欢爽的意志」。但是这个名称将不会使欲望配得上意志的价值, 它在大它者身上召唤的意志。它引诱那个意志从它的痛苦里,直接探究它的分裂的极端。因为当它这样做时, 欲望脱离, 被击败,注定无能为力。

For desire disappears [part] under pleasure's sway, pleasure's law being such as to make it always fall short of its aim: the homeostasis of the living being, always too quickly reestablished at the lowest threshold of tension at which he scrapes by, the ever early fall of the wing, with which desire is able to sign the reproduction of its form—a wing which here must nevertheless rise to the function of representing the link between sex and death. Let us lay that wing to rest behind its Eleusinian veil.

因为在欢乐的影响下,欲望消失。欢乐的法则是如此, 以致于使欲望总是没有到达它的目标。 人作为生物的体内平衡,总是太快就被重新建立在最低的紧张门槛。存活在那里,这个翅膀的早期掉落。使用这个翅膀, 欲望能够预示它的形式的复制---这一种翅膀在此必须被提升到代表性与死亡之间的联结的功能。 让我们将那个翅膀停靠在阿留辛尼安的面纱背后休息。

Pleasure, a rival of the will in Kant's system that provides a stimulus, is thus in Sade's work no more than a flagging [defaillant] accomplice. At the moment of climax [jouissance], it would simply be out of the picture if fantasy did not intervene to sustain it with the very discord to which it succumbs.

欢乐,在康德的系统里,是提供刺激的意志的敌对。在萨德的著作里,欢乐因此仅是一种下垂的共犯。在欢爽高潮的时刻,它仅是脱离画面, 假如幻见没有介入维持它,用它所屈服的不和谐。

Stated differently, fantasy provides the pleasure that is characteristic of desire. Let us recall that desire is not the subject, for it cannot be indicated anywhere in a signifier of any demand whatsoever, for it cannot be articulated in the signifier even though it is articulated there.

用不同角度来陈述, 幻见供应表现欲望特征的欢乐。 让我们回忆一下: 欲望并不是生命主体, 因为欲望无法在要求的能指的任何地方被指示。 因为它无法在能指里被表达,即使它存在那里。

雄伯译
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