SEXUALITY AND LIBIDO
FREUD OR JUNG
THE IMAGINARY IN NEUROSIS
THE SYMBOLIC IN PSYCHOSIS
Two planes have always been distinguished within which the exchange of human speech is played out - the plane of recognition in so far as speech links the subjects together into this pact which transforms them, and sets them up as human subjects communicating - the plane of the communiqué, in which one can distinguish all sorts of levels, the call, discussion, knowledge, information, but which, in the final analysis, involves a tendency to reach an agreement on the object. The term 'agreement' is still there, but here the emphasis is placed on the object considered as external to the action of speech, which speech expresses.
To be sure, the object is not devoid of reference to speech. From the start, it is already partially given in the system of objects, or objective system,3 in which one should include the accumulated prejudices which make up a cultural community, up to and including the hypotheses, the psychological prejudices even, from the most sophisticated generated by scientific work to the most naive and spontaneous, which most certainly do not fail considerably to influence scientific references, to the point of impregnating them.
So here is the subject invited to abandon himself entirely to this system - it is just as much the scientific knowledge he possesses or what he can imagine on
the basis of the facts he possesses as to his condition, his problem, his situation, as the most naive of his prejudices, upon which his illusions are founded, including his neurotic illusions, in so far as what is at stake there is an important part of the constitution of the neurosis.
It would seem - and this is where the problem lies - that this speech act can only progress along the path of intellectual conviction which emerges from educational intervention, that is to say a higher intervention, which comes from the analyst. Analysis progresses through indoctrination.
It is this indoctrination one has in mind when one talks about the first phase of analysis as having been intellectualist. Of course it never existed. Perhaps some intellectualist conceptions of analysis were around then, but that doesn't mean that intellectualist analyses actually took place - the forces authentically at work were there from the beginning. If they hadn't been, analysis would never have had the opportunity to show its mettle, and assert itself as an obvious method of psychothérapeute intervention.
What is called intellectualism in this context is something completely different from what is connoted were we to speak of something intellectual. The better we analyse the various levels of what is at stake, the better we will be able to distinguish what has to be distinguished and unify what has to be unified, and the more effective our technique will be. That is what we will try to do.
So, there really must be something other than indoctrination to explain the effectiveness of the analyst's interventions. That is what experience has shown to be efficacious in the action of transference^
That's where the opacity begins - what, after all, is transference?
In its essence, the efficacious transference which we're considering is quite simply the speech act. Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and full manner, there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference -something takes place which changes the nature of the two beings present.
But there what is at issue is a transference other than the one which is initially encountered in analysis not only as a problem, but as an obstacle. Indeed, this function Should be located on the imaginary plane. So it is to specify it, that the notions you are familiar with, the repetition of prehistoric situations, unconscious repetition, the putting into effect of a réintégration of history -history in the opposite sense to the one I once put forward, since it is a question of an imaginary réintégration, the past situation only being experienced in the present, without the knowledge of the subject, in so far as its historical dimension is misrecognised [méconnue] by him - you'll note that I didn't say unconscious.
All these ideas have been put forward so as to define what we observe, and their reward is a guaranteed empirical finding. They don't uncover, however, the reason, the function, the signification of what we observe in the real.
To expect an explanation for whatever is observed is, you'll perhaps tell me,
to expect too much, to manifest too great a thirst for theory. Several hard-headed characters would perhaps like to impose a damper on us at this point.