汉斯-赫尔曼·霍佩:社会主义:财产问题还是知识问题? (试发表)

非文学 译作
【依然是陈年草稿。原书http://book.douban.com/subject/3327201/ 这是第八章; 请朋友们修改、指正、润色。】 8 Socialism: A Property or Knowledge Problem? 社会主义:财产问题还是知识问题? I In a series of recent articles in the Review of Austrian Economics, Joseph Salerno began to de-homogenize the often conflated economic and social theories of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek. In particular, he has shown that their views on socialism are distinctly different, and he has argued in effect that Mises’s original argument in the so-called socialist calculation debate was correct all along and was also the final word, whereas Hayek’s distinct contribution to the debate was fallacious from the outset and merely added confusion. The following note will provide additional support to Salerno’s thesis. Joseph Salerno最近在奥地利经济学评论(Review of Austrian Economics)上发表了一系列文章,着手将通常被人们混为一谈的路德维希•冯•米塞斯与弗里德里希•A•哈耶克两人的经济学及社会学理论区分开来。尤其是他证明了他们两人对社会主义的看法有显著不同,并力陈在所谓的社会主义经经计算辩论中,米塞斯最初的论据在整个过程中一直正确,而且也是最终的结论;而哈耶克对辩论的独特贡献从一开始就错了,仅仅是为论辩增加了混乱而已。接下去的评论将为Salerno的论文提供更多的理论支持。 Mises’s well-known calculation argument states this: If there is no private property in land and other production factors, then there can also be no market prices for them. Hence, economic calculation, i.e., the comparison of anticipated revenue and expected cost expressed in terms of a common medium of exchange (which permits cardinal accounting operations), is literally impossible. Socialism’s fatal error is the absence of private property in land and production factors, and by implication, the absence of economic calculation. 米塞斯著名的经济计算论点陈述如下:如果土地和其它生产要素并非私有,也就谈不上有什么市场价格可以赋予它们。因此,经济计算,即以某种通用交换媒介为单位而进行的预期收益和预期成本的比较(可以采用基数式的会计运算),无疑是不可能的。社会主义的致命错误在于对土地和生产要素的私人所有的缺失——这也就意味着经济计算的缺失。 [Reprinted from theReview of Austrian Economics9, no. 1 (1992).] For Hayek, socialism’s problem is not a lack of property but a lack of knowledge. His distinctive thesis is altogether different from Mises’s.1For Hayek, the ultimate flaw of socialism is the fact that knowledge, in particular “the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place,” exists only in a widely dispersed form as the personal possession of various individuals; hence, it is practically impossible to assemble and process all the actually existing knowledge within the mind of a single socialist central planner. Hayek’s solution is not private property, but the decentralization of the use of knowledge. 对于哈耶克而言,社会主义的问题不是因为财产权缺失,而是知识的缺失。他的独特论点与米塞斯的截然不同。 哈耶克认为,归根结底,社会主义的缺陷是由于知识,尤其是“有关特定时间和地点的情形的知识”,只以广泛分散的形式,作为各种人的私人所有的形式存在。因此,实践上,要在单一的社会主义中央计划者的头脑中组合和加工所有既存知识是一项不可能的任务。哈耶克开给社会主义的药方不是确立私有财产,而是知识利用的去集中化。 Yet this is surely an absurd thesis. First, if the centralized use of knowledge is the problem, then it is difficult to explain why there are families, clubs, and firms, and why they do not face the very same problems as socialism. Families and firms also involve central planning. The family head and the owner of the firm also make plans which bind the use other people can make of their private knowledge, yet families and firms are not known to share the problems of socialism. For Mises, this observation poses no difficulty: under socialism private property is absent, whereas individual families and private firms are based on the very institutionof private property. However, for Hayek the smooth operation of families and firms is puzzling because his idea of a fully decentralized society is one in which each person makes his own decisions based on his own unique knowledge of the circumstances, unconstrained by any central plan or supraindividual (social) norm (such as the institution of private property). Second, if the desideratum is merely the decentralized use of knowledge in society, then it is difficult to explain why the problems of socialism are fundamentally different from those encountered by any other form of social organization. Every human organization, composed as it is of distinct individuals, constantly and unavoidably makes use of decentralized knowledge. In socialism, decentralized knowledge is utilized no less than in private firms or households. As in a firm, a central plan exists under socialism, and within the constraints of this plan, the socialist workers and the firm’s employees utilize their own decentralized knowledge of circumstances of time and place to implement and execute the plan. For Mises, all of this is completely beside the point. Within Hayek’s analytical framework, no difference between socialism and a private corporation exists. Hence, there can be no more wrong with socialism than with a private firm. 然而这无疑是一个荒谬的论断。首先,如果知识的集中化使用是问题的根源,那也就很难解释为什么会有家庭、俱乐部和企业,以及为什么它们不面临同样的社会主义弊病。家庭和企业同样进行中央计划。家庭的首脑和企业主同样制定妨碍其他人使用私人知识的计划,而人们从没发现这些机构和社会主义有同样的弊病。解释这个观察对米塞斯来说轻而易举:社会主义制度下私有财产缺失,而个体家庭和私人企业正是基于私有财产这一建制本身。但对哈耶克而言,家庭和企业的平稳经营是莫名其妙的,因为在他的观念里,一个完全去集中化的社会是一个人人得在其中根据自己关于具体境况的独特知识来做出自己的决策而不受任何中央计划或超个人(社会)伦范(如私有财产的建制)制约的社会。其次,如果所需之物仅仅是知识在社会中的分散利用,那么也就很难说明为什么社会主义的问题和任何其它形式的社会组织所面对的问题有何根本不同。事实上每个人类组织都由不同个人组成,无时不刻也不可避免地要利用分散的知识。社会主义体制下对分散知识的利用不见得比死人企业或家庭少。和在一个企业中一样,社会主义下也存在一个中央计划;在此计划的制约下,社会主义社会的劳动者和企业的员工都要利用各自的关于特定时间和地点的分散知识,以贯彻执行该计划。在米塞斯看来,这些完全是无关紧要的。在哈耶克的分析框架内,社会主义和私人企业之间没有区别。社会主义相较于私人企业,因而也没有错到哪里去。 Clearly, Hayek’s thesis regarding the central problem of socialism is nonsensical. What categorically distinguishes socialism from firms and families is not the existence of centralized knowledge or the lack of the use of decentralized knowledge, but rather the absence of private property, and hence, of prices. In fact, in occasional references to Mises and his original calculation argument, Hayek at times appears to realize this, too. But his attempt to integrate his very own thesis with Mises’s and thereby provide a new and higher theoretical synthesis fails. 显然,哈耶克就社会主义的核心弊病的论述是荒谬的。将企业、家庭同社会主义绝对地区分开来的绝非是否存在集中化了的知识,或是是否缺乏对分散知识的利用,而是私有财产的缺失,以及作为其衍生物的价格的缺失。事实上,哈耶克在不时地引用米塞斯及其最早的经济计算论据时也似乎偶尔意识到了这点。但他把自己的论据和米塞斯的整合到一起从而提出一个新的、更高层次的理论综合体的尝试失败了。 The Hayekian synthesis consists of the following propositional conjunction: “Fundamentally, in a system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different people” and “the price system” can serve as “a mechanism for communicating information.”2While the second part of this proposition strikes one as vaguely Misesian, it is anything but clear how it is logically related to the first, except through Hayek’s elusive association of “prices” with “information” and “knowledge.” However, this association is more of a semantic trick than rigorous argumentation. On one hand, it is harmless to speak of prices as conveying information. They inform about past exchange ratios, but it is a non-sequitur to conclude that socialism’s central problem is a lack of knowledge. This would only follow if prices actually were information. However, this is not the case. Prices convey knowledge, but they are the exchange ratios of various goods, which result from the voluntary interactions of distinct individuals based on the institution of private property. Without the institution of private property, the information conveyed by prices simply does not exist. Private property is the necessary condition—die Bedingung der Möglichkeit—of the knowledge communicated through prices. Yet then it is only correct to conclude, as Mises does, that it is the absence of the institution of private property which constitutes socialism’s problem. To claim that the problem is a lack of knowledge, as Hayek does, is to confuse cause and effect, or premise and consequence. 哈耶克的综合体包含如下的连结命题:“从根本上说,在一个关于相关事实的知识掌握在分散的许多人手中的体系中,价格能协调不同个人的单独行为”,和,“价格体系”可以作为“交流信息的机制”。 尽管第二个支命题含糊地表达了米塞斯的观点,如果不考虑哈耶克莫名其妙的对“价格”同“信息”与“知识”所作的关联,它和第一个支命题的逻辑联系毫不明晰。而且,哈耶克加诸两者的关联更多的是在耍语义上的花招,而非严格的论证。一方面,说价格传递信息是无关痛痒的。价格告诉人们过去的交换比率,但以此便推论出社会主义的核心弊病在于知识的匮乏是无效的。只有价格确确实实是信息,这个论断才能成立。但事实并非如此。价格传递知识,但它们是各种商品的交换比率,通过不同个人在私有财产建制的基础上开展的自愿合作而产生。私有财产是通过价格交流知识的必要条件——即是其可能的前提(die Bedingung der Möglichkeit)。那么,唯一正确的结论就是,由于私有财产建制的缺失才导致了社会主义的问题,这也就是米塞斯所作的结论。而像哈耶克那样宣称社会主义的问题是知识缺乏的问题则是混淆了前因后果,或者说,混淆了前提和结论。 On the other hand, Hayek’s identification of “prices” and “knowledge” involves a deceptive equivocation. Not only does Hayek fail to distinguish between what one might call institutional knowledge—information that requires for its existence an institution (such as the knowledge of prices requires private property)—and raw or extra institutional knowledge—such as this is an oak tree, I like peanuts, or birds can fly. Moreover, Hayek fails to notice that the knowledge of prices is not at all the same sort of knowledge whose existence he believes to be responsible for the “practical impossibility” of socialism and central planning. What makes central planning impossible, according to Hayek, is the fact that part of human knowledge exists only as essentially private information: 另一方面,哈耶克对“价格”和“知识”的界分有容易造成误解的含糊性。知识有建制性知识(institutional knowledge,必须有某种建制存在才能存在的知识,如价格的知识依赖于私有制的存在)以及自然或超建制知识(raw or extra institutional knowledge,诸如,这是一棵橡树,我喜欢花生和鸟会飞等)。哈耶克不仅没有认识到这一点,也没有注意到关于价格的知识与那种他认为实现社会主义和中央计划所必需的知识根本不属于同种类别。根据哈耶克,有部分人类的知识在本质上仅以私性信息的形式存在,致使中央计划不可能: practically every individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation.3 每个人实际上都对所有其他人来说具有某种优势,因为每个人都掌握可以利用的独一无二的信息,而基于这种信息的决策,只有由每个个人作出,或由他积极参与作出,这种信息才能被利用。 While it is certainly true that such knowledge exists, and while it is also true that uniquely private knowledge can never be centralized (without information losses), it is just as certainly not true that the knowledge of prices falls into this category of uniquely private information. To be sure, prices are “prices paid at specific times and places,” but this does not make them private information in the Hayekian sense. To the contrary, the information conveyed by prices is public information, because prices—qua objective exchange ratios—are real events. It may be difficult to know all of the prices paid at a specified date and location, just as it may be difficult to know every person’s physical location at any given time. Yet it is hardly impossible to know either one, and with current computer technology it is probably easy. In any case, while I may never know everything that you know, and vice versa, it is no more problematic to assume that both of us can simultaneously possess the same price information than that we can both simultaneously know the same baseball results. Hence, the knowledge conveyed by prices actually can be centralized. However, if price information is public information and thus can be centralized, then, according to Hayek’s thesis that socialism’s problem stems from the inefficiency of trying to centralize genuinely uncentralizable private knowledge, it would follow that the absence of prices, and hence of private property has nothing to do with the plight of socialism. Otherwise, if one insists with Mises that the absence of private property, and prices does have something to do with the plight of socialism, Hayek’s contribution to the socialism debate must be discarded as false, confusing, and irrelevant. 尽管这样的知识的存在是确然无疑的,又尽管独有的私性知识不可能(没有信息损失地)被集中化,关于价格的知识属于这种独有的私性知识范畴也绝不会为真。确实,价格是“在特定时间和地点支付的价格”,但这并没有使之成为哈耶克所指意义上的私性信息。相反的是,价格传递的是公共的信息,因为价格作为客观的交换比率,是真实的事件。虽然要知道在所有日期和地点支付的价格就像要知道每个人在各时的物理位置一般困难,但我们很难说了解这两种信息是困难的,有了当代的计算机技术,我们有可能轻松地克服困难。无论如何,尽管我可能永远无法知道你所知道的一切(反之亦然),我们也可以假设我们两人可以同时拥有同样的价格信息,就像我们可以同时知晓同样的棒球结果一样——这种假设是无可厚非的。因此,价格所传递的知识事实上可以被集中。可是,如果价格信息是公共信息,且因此可以被集中,那么根据哈耶克的论说,价格的缺失,也即私有财产的缺失和社会主义的困境无关——因为在哈耶克看来,社会主义的问题源于试图集中根本不能集中的私性知识的做法没有效率。否则,如果我们坚持米塞斯的论点,即社会主义的困境缺失和私有财产和价格的缺失有关,则哈耶克在社会主义论辩中的贡献当被丢弃,因为它们是错误的、混乱的、离题的。 Hayek’s misconception of the nature of socialism is symptomatic of a fundamental flaw in his thinking, pervading not only his economics but in particular also his political philosophy Hayek, as noted and quoted ad nauseam by his numerous followers, was convinced that “it is probably no exaggeration to say that every important advance in economic theory during the last hundred years was a further step in the consistent application of subjectivism.”4While this may well be true, it does not logically follow that every further advance toward subjectivism must also lead to an advance in economic theory. However, Hayek seems to have drawn this conclusion and has thus become a prime example illustrating its falsehood. 哈耶克对社会主义的本质的误解是其思考中的根本错误的典型体现,即他的超主观主义。这不仅表现在其经济学上,尤其还表现在其政治哲学之中:: his ultra-subjectivism.正如哈耶克为数众多的拥护者令人可笑地摘录和援引的,哈耶克深信,“大概可以毫不夸张地说,过去数百年中每一次经济学理论的进步都是对主观主义的进一步严格应用。” 尽管这话可能为真,但逻辑上它不能推出更进一步地向主观主义的推进必然带来经济学理论的又一个进步。但是,哈耶克似乎得出了这个结论,并因此成了展示此观点之谬误的首要例子。 Mises, and in his steps even more clearly Murray N. Rothbard, conceives of economics as the science of human action. Action has two inseparable aspects a subjective aspect (action is rational, intelligible action) and an objective aspect (acting is always acting with real things and physical stuff). Mises’s and Rothbard's economics and political philosophy is never anything but robust, and their categories and theories invariably possess real, operational meaning: private property, division of labor based on private property, production, direct and indirect exchange, and compulsory interference with private property and production and exchange such as taxation, counterfeiting, legislation, and regulation. 米塞斯视经济学为人类行动的科学。罗斯巴德继承了,甚至是更明显地体现了这一观点。行动有不可分割的两个方面:一个是主观的方面(行动是理性的、可理解的),还有一个客观的方面(行动总是要用到真实物品和物理材料)。Accordingly据此,米塞斯和罗斯巴德的经济学和政治哲学非常坚实,他们的范畴和理论无不拥有真实的、可用于实际操作的意义:私有财产,基于私有财产的劳动分工,生产,直接和间接交换以及强加于私有财产和生产交换上的干涉,如征税,货币干预,立法和规制。 In distinct contrast, Hayek—and misled by him to different degrees also Israel Kirzner and Ludwig Lachmann—views economics as some sort of science of human knowledge. Accordingly, Hayek’s categories and theories refer to purely subjective phenomena and are invariably elusive or even illusory. He is not concerned about acting with things but about knowledge and ignorance, the division, dispersion, and diffusion of knowledge, alertness, discovery, learning, and the coordination and divergence of plans and expectations. The external (physical) world and real (material) events have almost completely disappeared from his view. Hayek’s categories refer to mental states of affairs and relationships, completely detached from and compatible with any real physical state of affairs and events. 与他们截然相反的是,哈耶克——以及在不同程度上受其影响的伊斯雷尔•科兹纳(Israel Kirzner)和路德维希•拉赫曼(Ludwig Lachmann)——将经济学是为某种关于人类知识的科学。正因为如此,哈耶克的范畴和理论适用于纯粹主观的现象,且都是难于捉摸甚至是虚假的。他不关心通过物件进行的行动,他关心的是知识和无知,知识的分配、分布和扩散,机敏,发现,学习以及计划与预期的协调及偏离。外部(物理)世界和真实(物质)事件几乎完全在他的观点中消失了。哈耶克的各范畴指涉事务和关系的精神境况,任意事务和事件的实际的、物理的境况都与这些范畴无关,也无一与之相契合。 Most notable and disturbing is the ultra-subjectivist turn in Hayek’s political philosophy. According to a long-standing tradition of political philosophy shared by Mises and Rothbard, freedom is defined as the freedom to privately own and control real property, and coercion is the initiation of physical damage upon the private property of others. In distinct contrast, Hayek defines freedom as “a state in which each can use his own knowledge and for his own purposes,”5and coercion means “such control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in order to avoid greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another,”6or alternatively, “coercion occurs when one man’s actions are made to serve another man’s will, not for his own but for the other’s purpose”7(all emphases mine). Clearly, Hayek’s definition contains no reference to scarce goods and real tangible property, and provides no physical criterion or indicator whatsoever for the existence or nonexistence of either state of affairs. Rather coercion and freedom refer to specific configurations of subjective wills, plans, thoughts, or expectations. As mental predicates, Hayek’s definitions of freedom and coercion are compatible with every real, physical state of affairs.8 最值得注意也最令人不安的是哈耶克在其政治哲学中的超主观主义视角。根据一个为米塞斯和罗斯巴德所共享的悠久的政治哲学思想渊源,自由被定义为私人拥有和控制实在财产的自由;强制即对他人的私有财产造成物理损害。与之成鲜明对比的,哈耶克定义自由为“一种人人皆可为自己的目的利用自己的知识的境况” ,强制则指的是“一人的环境或情境为他人所控制,以致于为了避免所谓的更大的危害,他被迫不能按自己的一贯的计划行事,而只能服务于强制者的目的” ,或者,“强制发生于一人的行动被用于服务他人的意志、他人的目的,而非他自己的。” (着重号由作者添加)很明显,哈耶克的定义没有指涉稀缺财货和真实的有形财产,也没有提出任何物理标准或指示说明这两种事态是否存在。强制和自由指的倒是主观意愿、计划、思想或预期的特定配置。作为道德上的断言,哈耶克对自由和强制的定义同任何实在的、物理的事态相容。 It is beyond the scope of this note to offer a detailed critique and refutation of Hayek’s ultra-subjectivism. However, in addition to the fundamental question whether a science of knowledge as envisioned by Hayek is even possible (i.e., whether there can be any other science of knowledge apart from logic and epistemology on the one hand and the history of ideas on the other),9two conclusions are painfully clear. Even if Hayek’s science of knowledge is possible, it appears at best irrelevant because it is praxeologically meaningless. At worst it is intellectually pernicious in promoting relativism. 详细地批判和驳斥哈耶克的超主观主义已经超出了本评论的范围。不过,在哈耶克设想中的关于知识的科学是否可能(即,是否存在一种一方面脱离逻辑和认识论,另一方面与观念的历史无关的科学)这一根本问题之外 ,还有两个他需要痛苦面对的结论。即使哈耶克关于知识的科学是可能存在的,最乐观地看,它也不外乎和论辩的主题无关,因为在行动学上它是毫无意义的。而在最坏情况下它会推进相对主义,故而在知性上有害。 As for the real world of acting with physical property, of production and exchange, of money and markets, of profits and losses, of capital accumulation and of bankruptcies, there can be no lasting doubt about the existence of laws and the ceaseless operation of a tendency toward general equilibrium (action-coordination). Likewise, there can be no doubt about the existence of laws and the constant operation of dis-equilibrating tendencies within the world of actual taxation, counterfeiting, legislation, and regulation. Indeed, it would be extremely costly, even prohibitive, to not recognize such laws and tendencies and to adopt relativistic views. In contrast, in surreptitiously shifting attention from the tangible world of action and property to the ethereal world of knowledge, ideas, plans and expectations, relativistic views become attractive and cheap. There are no apparent regularities and tendencies in Hayek’s knowledge world. In fact, it is difficult to even imagine what “law” and “equilibrium” could possibly mean in the context of purely subjective phenomena. Instead there appears to exist nothing but constant kaleidoscopic change. 真实世界关乎动用物理财产的行动,关乎生产与交换,关乎货币与市场,关乎利润与亏损,关乎资本积累,关乎破产。对这个世界而言,法则和无时不刻的向一般均衡(行动协调)演进的趋势的存在都是不容长期质疑的。类似的,在这个有着真实的税收、货币干预、立法和规制的世界中无疑又存在着法律以及长存的偏离均衡的趋势。可以确信的是,不去认知这些法则和趋势,而采用相对主义的观点,其代价是极端昂贵的,甚至是禁止性的。相反地,如果暗中地将关注点从有形的,关于行动和财产的世界转移到飘渺的,关于知识、观念、计划和预期的世界,相对主义的观点变得富有吸引力且廉价。哈耶克的知识世界没有明确的规律和趋势。事实上,以纯粹主观的现象为语境,我们甚至难以想象“法则”和“均衡”能意指什么,那儿只有恒久的千变万化。 It is hardly surprising then that Hayek and his followers could proclaim such relativistic slogans as that we cannot do anything to improve our condition except rely on spontaneous evolution, that our future is completely unknowable, or that we cannot but participate in an endless and open-ended stream of conversation. As far as the realm of purely subjective phenomena is concerned and as addressed to a purely spiritual disembodied being, this may well be good advice. However, why would anyone with a bodily existence even care? As applied to the world of bodily action and property, such advice is self-destructive nonsense. 那么,哈耶克及其门徒喊出形如我们除了依赖自发演进外不能做任何事来改善我们的境地,我们的未来完全不可知或我们只能参与到一连串永无止境、开放式的对话之中这样的主观主义口号也就不足为奇了。这如果对仅关涉纯粹主观的现象的领域,对纯粹精神的、无实体的人而言,不失为一个好的建议。但是,以肉体形式存在的人又为何要关心这些呢?如果将之应用到包含实体性行动和财产的世界,这样的建议就成了自我摧毁的胡话。
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最后更新 2011-07-20 16:08:52
2016-01-28 14:06:27 heicuo (呵护)