拉康思想研究Ethics 28
Ethics 28
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康
That attempt at a hypothetical formulation is offered in a way that is unique
in Freud's extant writings. And one shouldn't forget that he came to dislike
it and didn't want to publish it. No doubt he wrote it in response to certain
demands for coherence he made of himself when confronted by himself. But
it must be said that this formulation apparently makes no reference to the
clinical facts, which doubtless constituted for him the whole force of the
demands he had to deal with. He discusses those questions with himself or
with Fliess, which under the circumstances comes to the same thing. He
presents himself with a probable and coherent representation, a working
hypothesis, in order to respond to something whose concrete, experimental
dimension is masked and avoided here.
想要从事假设的阐述的企图被提供，以独特的方式，在弗洛依德的残存的著作里。我们不应该忘记，他逐渐变得不喜欢它，并且不想要出版它。无可置疑地，他书写它，回应某些的要求，他解释他自己的一贯性的要求。当他面临他自己的时候。但是我们必须说，在这阐述显而易见地并没有提到临床的事实。无可置疑地，临床的事实对于他而言形成他必须要处理的要求的整个的力量。他讨论那些问题，跟他自己或跟弗利斯。在这种情况下，这等于是相同的事情。他呈现他自己一个难题，与一贯的再现，一个运作的假设，为了回应某件东西，这个东西的具体，试验的维度被遮蔽与被避免。
He claims it is a question of explaining a normal functioning of the mind.
In order to do this he starts with an apparatus whose basis is wholly antithetical
to a result involving adequation and equilibrium. He starts with a system
which naturally tends toward deception and error. That whole organism seems
designed not to satisfy need, but to hallucinate such satisfaction. It is, therefore,
appropriate that another apparatus is opposed to it, an apparatus that
operates as an agency of reality; it presents itself essentially as a principle of
correction, of a call to order. I am not exaggerating things. Freud himself
insists that there must be a distinction between the two apparatuses, although
he admits he can find no trace of them in the anatomical structures sustaining
them.
他宣称问题是要询问心灵的正常的功能。为了这样做，他开始用一个工具，这个工具的基础完全相反于这个结果，牵涉到胜任与体内平衡的结果。从一个系统开始，这个系统自然地倾向于欺骗与错误。整个有机体似乎被设计，不是为了满足需求，而是为了产生那种满足的幻觉。因此，另外一个工具跟他对立，是合宜的。这一个工具运作充当现实的代理。它代表它自己，基本上作为改正的一个原则，要求秩序的原则。我并没有夸张这些事情。弗洛依德自身坚持，必须要有一个区别，在这两个工具之间。虽然他承认，他不能够找到任何的其他痕迹，在维持它们的解剖的结构里。
The reality principle or that to which the functioning of the neuronic apparatus
in the end owes it efficacy appears as an apparatus that goes much
further than a mere checking up; it is rather a question of rectification. It
operates in the mode of detour, precaution, touching up, restraint. It corrects
and compensates for that which seems to be the natural inclination of the
psychic apparatus, and it radically opposes it.
现实原则似乎是作为一个原则，这个原则不仅仅是作为抑制的功能而言。脑神经的工具的这个功能最后将有效性归功于现实原则。相反地，现实原则是矫正的问题。现实原则运作，用的模式是迂迴，预警，修补，约束。现实原则改正并且补偿心灵工具的似乎是自然的倾向，现实原则强烈地跟这个倾向对立起来。
The conflict is introduced here at the base, at the origins of an organism
which, let us say, seems after all to be destined to live. Nobody before Freud,
and no other account of human behavior, had gone so far to emphasize its
fundamentally confhctual character. No one else had gone so far in explaining
the organism as a form of radical inadequation - to the point where the duality
of the systems is designed to overcome the radical inadequation of one of
them.
这个冲突在此被介绍，在基础的地方，在有机体的起源处，我们不妨说，毕竟这个有机体注定要活下去。在弗洛依德之前，没有任何人，也没有任何有关人类行为的记载，曾经如此深入地解释有机体，作为是一种强烈的不能胜任的形式。甚至，这些系统的双重性被设计要克服其中一个系统的强烈的不能胜任。
This opposition between the φ system and the ψ system, which is articulated
throughout, seems almost like a wager. For what is there to justify it,
if it isn't that experience of ungovernable quantities which Freud had to deal
with in his experience of neurosis? That is the driving imperative behind the
whole system.
在φ 系统与 ψ系统之间的对立无所不在地被表达，似乎就像个赌注。因为让存在那里自圆其说的东西，难道不就是无法被统辖的数量的那个经验吗？弗洛依德必须处理那个经验，在他的神经症的经验里？那是整个的系统背后的驱动的命令。
We sense directly that the justification for giving such prominence to quantity
as such has nothing to do with Freud's desire to bring his theory into
conformity with the mechanistic ideas of Helmholtz and Brucke. For him it
corresponds rather to the most direct kind of lived experience, namely, that
of the inertia which at the level of symptoms presented him with obstacles
whose irreversible character he recognized.
我们直接感觉到，给予数量本身如此显著的地位的正当理由，跟弗洛依德的欲望没有丝毫关系，弗洛依德欲望要将他的理论保持一致，跟黑赫兹与布鲁克的机械论的观念保持一致。相反地，对于弗洛依德，他的理论对应于最直接的那种生活过的经验。换句话说，惰性的经验，在病症的层次，这个惰性呈现给他各种的阻碍。他体认出这些阻碍的无法逆转的特性。
It is here that one finds his first
advance in darkness toward that Wirklichkeit, which is the point to which his
questioning returns; it is the key, the distinctive feature of his whole system.
I ask you to reread this text, without wondering along with the annotators,
commentators and connotators who have edited it whether this or that is
closer to psychological or physiological thought, whether this or that refers
to Herbart, Helmholtz, or anyone else. And you will see that beneath a manner
that is cool, abstract, scholastic, complex and arid, one can sense a lived
experience, and that this experience is at bottom moral in kind.
就在此，我们发现他第一个进展，在朝向Wirklichkeit,的黑暗中。这个Wirklichkeit,就是他的询问的回转的点。这就是解答，整个的系统的不同的特征，我要求你们重新阅读这个文本，不要去想要知道这个注释或那个注释比较靠近心理学或生理学的思想，或这个注释或那个注释提到赫伯特，黑赫兹，或任何其他人，虽然这些注释家，评论家，与注疏家曾经编辑他们。你们将会看见，在冷静，抽象，学术，复杂与枯燥的形态之下，我们感觉到活生生的经验。这个经验追根究底是属于道德的种类。
People play the historian on this topic, as if to explain an author like Freud
in terms of influences had any value, to explain him by means of a greater or
lesser similarity between one of his formulas and those which had been used
by some previous thinker in a context that was different. But since it is an
exercise that people engage in, why shouldn't I do the same, in my own way?
Isn't the functioning of the apparatus that supports the reality principle
strangely similar to what one finds in Aristotle?
针对这个议题，人们扮演历史学家。好像是，解释一位像弗洛依德这样的作者，用影响的术语，就具有任何价值似的。解释弗洛依德，凭借或多或少的类似，在他的其中一个公式与某位先前的思想家曾经用过的公式的类似，在不同的文本那里。但是这是人们从事的做法，为什么我不如法泡制，用我自己的方式？难道不是这个工具的功能支持著现实原则？它奇异地类同我们在亚里斯多德发现的东西？
Freud's task is to explain how the activity of review and restraint functions
or, in other words, how the apparatus which supports the secondary processes
avoids the occurrence of catastrophes that would inevitably follow the
lapse of too much or too little time or the abandonment to its own devices of
the pleasure principle. If the latter is released too soon, the movement will
be triggered simply by a Wunschgedanke; it will necessarily be painful and
will give rise to unpleasure. If on the other hand the secondary apparatus
intervenes too late, if it doesn't give the little discharge required to attempt
the beginning of an adequate solution through action, then there will be a
regressive discharge, that is to say, an hallucination, which is also a source of
displeasure.
弗洛依德的工作是要解释评论与约束的功能的活动，或换句话说，支持次级的过程的工具，如何避免灾难的发生？这些灾难将一成不变地遵循过多或多少时间的失误，或是放纵于它自己的快乐原则的设计。假如后者太早被释放出来，这个运动将会被触发，仅是凭借Wunschgedanke欲望的观念，它将必然是令人痛苦，而且将会产生不愉快。假如另一方面，这个次要的工具介入得太晚，假如它没有给予这个小小的发泄，被要求要企图通过行动来获得充分解决的开始，那么将会有一个退行的发泄。换句话说，一个幻觉，这个幻觉也是不愉快的来源。
Well now, this theory is not unrelated to Aristotle's ideas concerning the
question of how it is that someone who knows may be intemperate. Aristotle
offers several solutions. I will skip the earlier ones, which introduce syllogistic
and dialectical elements that are relatively remote from our concerns here.
He also attempts a solution that is not dialectical but physical - he nevertheless
advances it in the form of a syllogism of the desirable.
呵呵，这个理论跟亚里斯多德的观念，并非没有关联。关于这个问题：某位知道的人如何会是放纵，亚里斯多德提供好几个解决。我将跳过早先的几个解决，它们介绍逻辑三段论法与辩证法的因素。这些因素跟我们在此的关注比较遥远。他也企图从事非辩证法，而是生理的解决—他仍然主张它，用可被欲望物的三段论法的形式。
I believe that Chapter V of Book VII on pleasure is worth reading in its
entirety. Beside the major premise - one must always taste what is sweet -
there is a particular, concrete minor premise, i.e., this is sweet. And the
principle of wrong action is to be found in the error of a particular judgment
relative to the minor premise. Where is the error found? Precisely in the
circumstance that the desire which is subjacent to the major premise causes
the wrong judgment to be made concerning the reality of the supposed sweetness
toward which the action is directed.
我相信第七册第四章“论快乐”是值得完整地阅读。除了主要的假设之外—我们总是品尝甜美的东西--有一个特殊，具体的次要的假设，这是甜美的东西。错误行动的原则能够被发现，在特殊判断的错误理，相对应这个次要的假设。这个错误在哪里被发现？确实是在这个环境里，邻接于主要的假设的欲望，引起错误的判断被做，关于这个被认为是甜美的现实，行动被引导朝向这个被认为的甜美。
I can't help thinking that Freud, who had attended the lecture series given
by Brentano on Aristotle in 1887, is transposing here the properly ethical
articulation of the problem on to a hypothetical, mechanistic point of view.
And he does so in a way that is purely formal and gives the question a completely
different accent.
我忍不住地认为，弗洛依德曾经参加过那些演讲的系列，1887年布仁塔诺的“亚里斯多德的演讲”。弗洛依德在此将这个难题的合乎伦理的表达，调换成为一个假设的机械论的观点。弗洛依德这样做，採有非常正式的的方法，并且给予这个问题，一个非常不同的强调。
In truth, it is no more of a psychology than any other of those that were
devised at the time. Let us have no illusions; as far as psychology is concerned,
nothing has been achieved so far that is superior to Freud's Entwurf.
Everything that has been devised concerning the functioning of the psyche
under the assumption that the mechanisms of the nervous system can account
for what is concretely perceived by us as the field of psychological action has
a similar air of fanciful hypothesis.
事实上，它不再属于心理学，也不再属于任何其他当时被设计的学科。让我们不要存著幻想。就心理学而言，迄今还没有成就任何东西，超越过弗洛依德的“筹划”。每样曾经被设计的东西，关于心灵的这个功能，在这个假设之下：脑神经系统的机制能够解释具体被我们感知的东西，如同心理的活动具有类似的幻想的假设的气氛。
If Freud returns to the logical and syllogistic articulations, which have
always been used by ethical philosophers in their field, it is in order to give
them a very different meaning. We must remember that in interpreting the
true content of his thought, which is to say what I have taught you. The
ορθός λόγος that concerns us here are not simply major premises; they concern
rather the way in which I have taught you to articulate what goes on in
the unconscious; they concern the discourse that is employed on the level of
the pleasure principle.
假如弗洛依德回到逻辑与三段论房的表达，它们总是被这个领域的伦理哲学家所使用。那是为了给予它们一个非常不同的意义。我们必须记得，当我们解释弗洛依德的思想的内容，也就是说，为曾经教导你们的东西。ορθός λόγος “正确的辞说”在此跟我们息息相关，它们并不仅是主要的假设。相反地，它们跟我曾经教导你们的方式息息相关。我曾经教导你们表达无意识里正在进行的东西。它们跟这个辞说息息相关。在快乐原则被使用的辞说。
It is in relation to this ορθός, ironically highlighted by inverted commas,
that the reality principle has to guide the subject in order for him to complete
a possible action.
就是跟这个ορθός（正确）的关系，用倒转的引号反讽地强调的东西，现实原则必须引导主体，为了让他完成一个可能的行动。
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The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康
That attempt at a hypothetical formulation is offered in a way that is unique
in Freud's extant writings. And one shouldn't forget that he came to dislike
it and didn't want to publish it. No doubt he wrote it in response to certain
demands for coherence he made of himself when confronted by himself. But
it must be said that this formulation apparently makes no reference to the
clinical facts, which doubtless constituted for him the whole force of the
demands he had to deal with. He discusses those questions with himself or
with Fliess, which under the circumstances comes to the same thing. He
presents himself with a probable and coherent representation, a working
hypothesis, in order to respond to something whose concrete, experimental
dimension is masked and avoided here.
想要从事假设的阐述的企图被提供，以独特的方式，在弗洛依德的残存的著作里。我们不应该忘记，他逐渐变得不喜欢它，并且不想要出版它。无可置疑地，他书写它，回应某些的要求，他解释他自己的一贯性的要求。当他面临他自己的时候。但是我们必须说，在这阐述显而易见地并没有提到临床的事实。无可置疑地，临床的事实对于他而言形成他必须要处理的要求的整个的力量。他讨论那些问题，跟他自己或跟弗利斯。在这种情况下，这等于是相同的事情。他呈现他自己一个难题，与一贯的再现，一个运作的假设，为了回应某件东西，这个东西的具体，试验的维度被遮蔽与被避免。
He claims it is a question of explaining a normal functioning of the mind.
In order to do this he starts with an apparatus whose basis is wholly antithetical
to a result involving adequation and equilibrium. He starts with a system
which naturally tends toward deception and error. That whole organism seems
designed not to satisfy need, but to hallucinate such satisfaction. It is, therefore,
appropriate that another apparatus is opposed to it, an apparatus that
operates as an agency of reality; it presents itself essentially as a principle of
correction, of a call to order. I am not exaggerating things. Freud himself
insists that there must be a distinction between the two apparatuses, although
he admits he can find no trace of them in the anatomical structures sustaining
them.
他宣称问题是要询问心灵的正常的功能。为了这样做，他开始用一个工具，这个工具的基础完全相反于这个结果，牵涉到胜任与体内平衡的结果。从一个系统开始，这个系统自然地倾向于欺骗与错误。整个有机体似乎被设计，不是为了满足需求，而是为了产生那种满足的幻觉。因此，另外一个工具跟他对立，是合宜的。这一个工具运作充当现实的代理。它代表它自己，基本上作为改正的一个原则，要求秩序的原则。我并没有夸张这些事情。弗洛依德自身坚持，必须要有一个区别，在这两个工具之间。虽然他承认，他不能够找到任何的其他痕迹，在维持它们的解剖的结构里。
The reality principle or that to which the functioning of the neuronic apparatus
in the end owes it efficacy appears as an apparatus that goes much
further than a mere checking up; it is rather a question of rectification. It
operates in the mode of detour, precaution, touching up, restraint. It corrects
and compensates for that which seems to be the natural inclination of the
psychic apparatus, and it radically opposes it.
现实原则似乎是作为一个原则，这个原则不仅仅是作为抑制的功能而言。脑神经的工具的这个功能最后将有效性归功于现实原则。相反地，现实原则是矫正的问题。现实原则运作，用的模式是迂迴，预警，修补，约束。现实原则改正并且补偿心灵工具的似乎是自然的倾向，现实原则强烈地跟这个倾向对立起来。
The conflict is introduced here at the base, at the origins of an organism
which, let us say, seems after all to be destined to live. Nobody before Freud,
and no other account of human behavior, had gone so far to emphasize its
fundamentally confhctual character. No one else had gone so far in explaining
the organism as a form of radical inadequation - to the point where the duality
of the systems is designed to overcome the radical inadequation of one of
them.
这个冲突在此被介绍，在基础的地方，在有机体的起源处，我们不妨说，毕竟这个有机体注定要活下去。在弗洛依德之前，没有任何人，也没有任何有关人类行为的记载，曾经如此深入地解释有机体，作为是一种强烈的不能胜任的形式。甚至，这些系统的双重性被设计要克服其中一个系统的强烈的不能胜任。
This opposition between the φ system and the ψ system, which is articulated
throughout, seems almost like a wager. For what is there to justify it,
if it isn't that experience of ungovernable quantities which Freud had to deal
with in his experience of neurosis? That is the driving imperative behind the
whole system.
在φ 系统与 ψ系统之间的对立无所不在地被表达，似乎就像个赌注。因为让存在那里自圆其说的东西，难道不就是无法被统辖的数量的那个经验吗？弗洛依德必须处理那个经验，在他的神经症的经验里？那是整个的系统背后的驱动的命令。
We sense directly that the justification for giving such prominence to quantity
as such has nothing to do with Freud's desire to bring his theory into
conformity with the mechanistic ideas of Helmholtz and Brucke. For him it
corresponds rather to the most direct kind of lived experience, namely, that
of the inertia which at the level of symptoms presented him with obstacles
whose irreversible character he recognized.
我们直接感觉到，给予数量本身如此显著的地位的正当理由，跟弗洛依德的欲望没有丝毫关系，弗洛依德欲望要将他的理论保持一致，跟黑赫兹与布鲁克的机械论的观念保持一致。相反地，对于弗洛依德，他的理论对应于最直接的那种生活过的经验。换句话说，惰性的经验，在病症的层次，这个惰性呈现给他各种的阻碍。他体认出这些阻碍的无法逆转的特性。
It is here that one finds his first
advance in darkness toward that Wirklichkeit, which is the point to which his
questioning returns; it is the key, the distinctive feature of his whole system.
I ask you to reread this text, without wondering along with the annotators,
commentators and connotators who have edited it whether this or that is
closer to psychological or physiological thought, whether this or that refers
to Herbart, Helmholtz, or anyone else. And you will see that beneath a manner
that is cool, abstract, scholastic, complex and arid, one can sense a lived
experience, and that this experience is at bottom moral in kind.
就在此，我们发现他第一个进展，在朝向Wirklichkeit,的黑暗中。这个Wirklichkeit,就是他的询问的回转的点。这就是解答，整个的系统的不同的特征，我要求你们重新阅读这个文本，不要去想要知道这个注释或那个注释比较靠近心理学或生理学的思想，或这个注释或那个注释提到赫伯特，黑赫兹，或任何其他人，虽然这些注释家，评论家，与注疏家曾经编辑他们。你们将会看见，在冷静，抽象，学术，复杂与枯燥的形态之下，我们感觉到活生生的经验。这个经验追根究底是属于道德的种类。
People play the historian on this topic, as if to explain an author like Freud
in terms of influences had any value, to explain him by means of a greater or
lesser similarity between one of his formulas and those which had been used
by some previous thinker in a context that was different. But since it is an
exercise that people engage in, why shouldn't I do the same, in my own way?
Isn't the functioning of the apparatus that supports the reality principle
strangely similar to what one finds in Aristotle?
针对这个议题，人们扮演历史学家。好像是，解释一位像弗洛依德这样的作者，用影响的术语，就具有任何价值似的。解释弗洛依德，凭借或多或少的类似，在他的其中一个公式与某位先前的思想家曾经用过的公式的类似，在不同的文本那里。但是这是人们从事的做法，为什么我不如法泡制，用我自己的方式？难道不是这个工具的功能支持著现实原则？它奇异地类同我们在亚里斯多德发现的东西？
Freud's task is to explain how the activity of review and restraint functions
or, in other words, how the apparatus which supports the secondary processes
avoids the occurrence of catastrophes that would inevitably follow the
lapse of too much or too little time or the abandonment to its own devices of
the pleasure principle. If the latter is released too soon, the movement will
be triggered simply by a Wunschgedanke; it will necessarily be painful and
will give rise to unpleasure. If on the other hand the secondary apparatus
intervenes too late, if it doesn't give the little discharge required to attempt
the beginning of an adequate solution through action, then there will be a
regressive discharge, that is to say, an hallucination, which is also a source of
displeasure.
弗洛依德的工作是要解释评论与约束的功能的活动，或换句话说，支持次级的过程的工具，如何避免灾难的发生？这些灾难将一成不变地遵循过多或多少时间的失误，或是放纵于它自己的快乐原则的设计。假如后者太早被释放出来，这个运动将会被触发，仅是凭借Wunschgedanke欲望的观念，它将必然是令人痛苦，而且将会产生不愉快。假如另一方面，这个次要的工具介入得太晚，假如它没有给予这个小小的发泄，被要求要企图通过行动来获得充分解决的开始，那么将会有一个退行的发泄。换句话说，一个幻觉，这个幻觉也是不愉快的来源。
Well now, this theory is not unrelated to Aristotle's ideas concerning the
question of how it is that someone who knows may be intemperate. Aristotle
offers several solutions. I will skip the earlier ones, which introduce syllogistic
and dialectical elements that are relatively remote from our concerns here.
He also attempts a solution that is not dialectical but physical - he nevertheless
advances it in the form of a syllogism of the desirable.
呵呵，这个理论跟亚里斯多德的观念，并非没有关联。关于这个问题：某位知道的人如何会是放纵，亚里斯多德提供好几个解决。我将跳过早先的几个解决，它们介绍逻辑三段论法与辩证法的因素。这些因素跟我们在此的关注比较遥远。他也企图从事非辩证法，而是生理的解决—他仍然主张它，用可被欲望物的三段论法的形式。
I believe that Chapter V of Book VII on pleasure is worth reading in its
entirety. Beside the major premise - one must always taste what is sweet -
there is a particular, concrete minor premise, i.e., this is sweet. And the
principle of wrong action is to be found in the error of a particular judgment
relative to the minor premise. Where is the error found? Precisely in the
circumstance that the desire which is subjacent to the major premise causes
the wrong judgment to be made concerning the reality of the supposed sweetness
toward which the action is directed.
我相信第七册第四章“论快乐”是值得完整地阅读。除了主要的假设之外—我们总是品尝甜美的东西--有一个特殊，具体的次要的假设，这是甜美的东西。错误行动的原则能够被发现，在特殊判断的错误理，相对应这个次要的假设。这个错误在哪里被发现？确实是在这个环境里，邻接于主要的假设的欲望，引起错误的判断被做，关于这个被认为是甜美的现实，行动被引导朝向这个被认为的甜美。
I can't help thinking that Freud, who had attended the lecture series given
by Brentano on Aristotle in 1887, is transposing here the properly ethical
articulation of the problem on to a hypothetical, mechanistic point of view.
And he does so in a way that is purely formal and gives the question a completely
different accent.
我忍不住地认为，弗洛依德曾经参加过那些演讲的系列，1887年布仁塔诺的“亚里斯多德的演讲”。弗洛依德在此将这个难题的合乎伦理的表达，调换成为一个假设的机械论的观点。弗洛依德这样做，採有非常正式的的方法，并且给予这个问题，一个非常不同的强调。
In truth, it is no more of a psychology than any other of those that were
devised at the time. Let us have no illusions; as far as psychology is concerned,
nothing has been achieved so far that is superior to Freud's Entwurf.
Everything that has been devised concerning the functioning of the psyche
under the assumption that the mechanisms of the nervous system can account
for what is concretely perceived by us as the field of psychological action has
a similar air of fanciful hypothesis.
事实上，它不再属于心理学，也不再属于任何其他当时被设计的学科。让我们不要存著幻想。就心理学而言，迄今还没有成就任何东西，超越过弗洛依德的“筹划”。每样曾经被设计的东西，关于心灵的这个功能，在这个假设之下：脑神经系统的机制能够解释具体被我们感知的东西，如同心理的活动具有类似的幻想的假设的气氛。
If Freud returns to the logical and syllogistic articulations, which have
always been used by ethical philosophers in their field, it is in order to give
them a very different meaning. We must remember that in interpreting the
true content of his thought, which is to say what I have taught you. The
ορθός λόγος that concerns us here are not simply major premises; they concern
rather the way in which I have taught you to articulate what goes on in
the unconscious; they concern the discourse that is employed on the level of
the pleasure principle.
假如弗洛依德回到逻辑与三段论房的表达，它们总是被这个领域的伦理哲学家所使用。那是为了给予它们一个非常不同的意义。我们必须记得，当我们解释弗洛依德的思想的内容，也就是说，为曾经教导你们的东西。ορθός λόγος “正确的辞说”在此跟我们息息相关，它们并不仅是主要的假设。相反地，它们跟我曾经教导你们的方式息息相关。我曾经教导你们表达无意识里正在进行的东西。它们跟这个辞说息息相关。在快乐原则被使用的辞说。
It is in relation to this ορθός, ironically highlighted by inverted commas,
that the reality principle has to guide the subject in order for him to complete
a possible action.
就是跟这个ορθός（正确）的关系，用倒转的引号反讽地强调的东西，现实原则必须引导主体，为了让他完成一个可能的行动。
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