拉康思想研究Ethics 30
Ethics 30
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康
Pleasure and reality
快乐与现实
THE MORAL AGENCY ACTUALIZES THE REAL
道德代理者实践实在界
INERTIA AND RECTIFICATION
堕性与矫正
REALITY IS PRECARIOUS
现实不稳定
OPPOSITION AND INTERSECTION OF THE PRINCIPLES
两种原种的对立与交会
3
From a Freudian point of view, the reality principle is presented as functioning
in a way that is essentially precarious.
从弗洛依德的观点，现实原则被呈现作为功能，採用基本上是不稳定的方式。
No previous philosophy has gone so far in that direction. It is not that
reality is called into question; it is certainly not called into question in the
way that the idealists did so. Compared to Freud the idealists of the philosophical
tradition are small beer indeed, for in the last analysis they don't
seriously contest that famous reality, they merely tame it. Idealism consists
in affirming that we are the ones who give shape to reality, and that there is
no point in looking any further. It is a comfortable position. Freud's position,
or that of any sensible man for that matter, is something very different.
Reality is precarious.
没有任何其他先前的哲学曾经如此深入地探讨那个方向。倒不是因为现实受到质疑。现实受到质疑的方式，确实不是像理型主义者受到质疑的方式那样。跟弗洛依德比较起来，哲学传统的理型主义者确实仅是小儿科。因为追根究底，他们并没有认真地测试那个著名的现实。他们仅是驯服现实。理型主义者主要在于肯定：我们是给予现实的形状的那些人们。再深入探讨是没有意义的。这是一个舒适的立场。弗洛依德的立场则是某件不同的东西，就那件事情而言，弗洛依德的立场上明理的人的立场。现实是不稳定的。
And it is precisely to the extent that access to it is so
precarious that the commandments which trace its path are so tyrannical. As
guides to the real, feelings are deceptive. That intuition which animates the
whole auto-analysis of Freud expresses itself thus concerning the approach
to the real. Its very movement can only begin to occur by means of a primary
defense. The profound ambiguity of this approach to the real demanded by
man is first inscribed in terms of a defense - a defense that already exists
even before the conditions of repression as such are formulated.
确实是接近现实时是如此的不稳定，以致于追踪它的途径的命令是如此的暴虐。作为实在界的引导，那些感觉是欺骗性。触动弗洛依德的整个的自动-精神分析的直觉，因此表达它自己，关于接近实在界。它的行动仅是凭借原初的防卫开始发生。接近实在界的这个深奥的模糊暧昧，受到人的要求，它首先被铭记，用防卫的术语。这一种防卫甚至已经存在于压抑的本身的情况被阐述之前。
In order to emphasize what I am calling the paradox of the relationship to
the real in Freud, I will put this on the board - the pleasure principle on the
one hand and reality principle on the other. Once you have been gently reassured
by these two terms, things seem to go along by themselves. Speaking
broadly, one can say that the unconscious is on one side and the conscious
on the other. Please bear that in mind in your attempt to follow the points I
am trying to bring out.
为了强调我正在所谓的在弗洛依德，跟实在界的关系的悖论。我将这个悖论写在黑板上。一方面是快乐原则，另一方面是现实原则。一旦你们已经对这两个术语稍微确定，事情似乎自己会一路前进。广泛地说，我们能够说，一方面是无意识，另一方面是意识。请你们记在心理，当你们企图要遵循我正在揭露的这些要点。
What are we led to articulate the apparatus of perception onto? Onto reality,
of course. Yet, if we follow Freud's hypothesis, on what theoretically is
the control of the pleasure principle exercised? Precisely on perception, and
it is here that one finds the originality of his contribution. The primary process,
as he tells us in the seventh part of the Traumdeutung, tends to be exercised
toward an identity of perception. It doesn't matter whether it is real or
hallucinated, such an identity will always tend to be established. If it isn't
lucky enough to coincide with reality, it will be hallucinated. The risk is in
the possibility of the primary process winning out.
我们被引导要将感知的工具表达成为什么？当然是表达成为现实。可是，假如我们遵循弗洛依德的假设，对于快乐原则的控制理论上要根据什么来运作？确实是根据感知。而且这感知这里，我们发现弗洛依德的贡献的原创性。依照弗洛依德这“梦的解析”的第七部分，原初的过程倾向于被运用，朝向感知的认同。至于感知的认同是真实或是幻觉，并不重要。这样的认同将总是倾向于被建立。假如它没有足够幸运跟现实巧合一致，它将会是幻觉。这个冒险是在逐渐战胜的原初的过程的可能性。
On the other hand, what does the secondary process tend toward? Once
again you should look at Chapter VII, but it is already articulated in the
Enrumrf. It tends toward an identity of thought. What does that mean? It
means that the interior functioning of the psychic apparatus - I will discuss
next time how it might be represented schematically - occurs as a kind of
groping forward, a rectifying test, thanks to which the subject, led on by the
discharges that follow along the Bahnungen already established, will conduct
the series of tests or of detours that will gradually lead him to anastomosis
and to moving beyond the testing of the surrounding system of different
objects present at that moment of its experience. One might say that the
backcloth of experience consists in the construction of a certain system of
Wunsch or of Erwartung of pleasure, defined as anticipated pleasure, and which
tends for this reason to realize itself autonomously in its own sphere, theoretically
without expecting anything from the outside. It moves directly toward
a fulfillment highly antithetical to whatever triggers it.
在另一方面，这个次级过程倾向于什么？再次地，你们应该观看第七章，但是它已经被表达，在“筹划”一书。它倾向于思想的认同。那是什么意思？它的意思是，心灵的工具的内部的功能—下次我将讨论它如何用基模方式来代表—这个功能的发生，作为一种向前模索，一种矫正的测试。由于这个矫正的测试，主体将会主导这一系列的测试或一系列的迂迴。因为它被这些发泄所引导，遵循Bahnungen （方便途径）已经建立的发泄所引导。这一系统的测试或一系列的迂迴逐渐引导他到汇集一块，引导他到移动超越过周围系统的测试，出现在它的经验的那个时刻不同的客体的周围系统。我们可以说，经验的背景主要是在于建立某个愿望的系统，或快乐的期望。它被定义为被预期的快乐。因为这个理由，它倾向于自动自发地实践它自己，在它自己的范围里。理论上，它并没有从外部期望任何东西。它直接地朝向满足前进。这个满足跟任何触发它的东西高度地对立。
In this preliminary approach, thought ought to appear to be on the level
of the reality principle, in the same column as the reality principle. But it is
by no means the case, since as described by Freud, this process is in itself
and by nature unconscious. Understand that unlike that which reaches the
subject in the perceptual order from the outside world, nothing that takes
place at the level of these tests - thanks to which, by means of approximations
in the psyche, the facilitations are realized that enable the subject to
make his action adequate - is perceptible as such. All thought by its very
nature occurs according to unconscious means. It is doubtless not controlled
by the pleasure principle, but it occurs in a space that as an unconscious space
is to be considered as subject to the pleasure principle.
在这个初级的接近实在界，思想应该出现在现实原则的层面，在跟现实相同的栏框。但是它绝非是这个情况，因为依照弗洛依德所描述的，这个过程本身及其本质是无意识。请你们理解，不像从外部世界的感知的秩序到达主体的东西，发生在这些测试的层面的东西，没有一样可依照本身被感知。由于这次测试，凭借心灵的接近，有些方便途径被体会到，让主体能够使他的行动胜任。所有的思想由于它自己的特性，依照无意识而发生。无可置疑地，它并没有受到快乐原则的控制，但是它发生在一个空间。作为无意识的空间，这个空间应该被认为隶属于快乐原则。
Of everything that occurs at the level of inner processes, and thought itself
is such a process, according to Freud, the only signs of which the subject is
consciously aware are signs of pleasure or pain. As with all the other unconscious
processes, nothing else reaches the level of consciousness but those
signs there.
关于每样发生在内部过程的层面的东西，思想本身并不是这样的过程。依照弗洛依德，这个过程的唯一的讯息，主体在意识上是知道。这些讯息是快乐或痛苦的讯息。如同所有的其他无意识的过程，没有别的东西到底意识的层面，除了在那里的那些讯息。
How then do we have some apprehension of those processes of thought?
Here again Freud responds in a fully articulated way - only insofar as words
are uttered. An idea that, with the tendency to facility characteristic of all
thought that in spite of itself is tainted by a kind of parallelism, is commonly
interpreted as follows: "It is, of course, clear that what Freud is telling us
there is that words are that which characterizes the transition into the preconscious."
But the transition of what precisely?
那么我们如何理解思想的这些过程？在此，弗洛依德再次回应，用充分被表达的方式，仅是就文字被表达的方式。一个观念具有方便一切思想的特性的倾向，尽管它的自身沾染一种的并列对比，它通常被解释如下：「当然，显而易见的是，弗洛依德正在告诉我们的东西就是：表现这个转换成为前意识的特性的文字。」但是那确实是什么的转换：
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http://springhero.wordpress.com
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康
Pleasure and reality
快乐与现实
THE MORAL AGENCY ACTUALIZES THE REAL
道德代理者实践实在界
INERTIA AND RECTIFICATION
堕性与矫正
REALITY IS PRECARIOUS
现实不稳定
OPPOSITION AND INTERSECTION OF THE PRINCIPLES
两种原种的对立与交会
3
From a Freudian point of view, the reality principle is presented as functioning
in a way that is essentially precarious.
从弗洛依德的观点，现实原则被呈现作为功能，採用基本上是不稳定的方式。
No previous philosophy has gone so far in that direction. It is not that
reality is called into question; it is certainly not called into question in the
way that the idealists did so. Compared to Freud the idealists of the philosophical
tradition are small beer indeed, for in the last analysis they don't
seriously contest that famous reality, they merely tame it. Idealism consists
in affirming that we are the ones who give shape to reality, and that there is
no point in looking any further. It is a comfortable position. Freud's position,
or that of any sensible man for that matter, is something very different.
Reality is precarious.
没有任何其他先前的哲学曾经如此深入地探讨那个方向。倒不是因为现实受到质疑。现实受到质疑的方式，确实不是像理型主义者受到质疑的方式那样。跟弗洛依德比较起来，哲学传统的理型主义者确实仅是小儿科。因为追根究底，他们并没有认真地测试那个著名的现实。他们仅是驯服现实。理型主义者主要在于肯定：我们是给予现实的形状的那些人们。再深入探讨是没有意义的。这是一个舒适的立场。弗洛依德的立场则是某件不同的东西，就那件事情而言，弗洛依德的立场上明理的人的立场。现实是不稳定的。
And it is precisely to the extent that access to it is so
precarious that the commandments which trace its path are so tyrannical. As
guides to the real, feelings are deceptive. That intuition which animates the
whole auto-analysis of Freud expresses itself thus concerning the approach
to the real. Its very movement can only begin to occur by means of a primary
defense. The profound ambiguity of this approach to the real demanded by
man is first inscribed in terms of a defense - a defense that already exists
even before the conditions of repression as such are formulated.
确实是接近现实时是如此的不稳定，以致于追踪它的途径的命令是如此的暴虐。作为实在界的引导，那些感觉是欺骗性。触动弗洛依德的整个的自动-精神分析的直觉，因此表达它自己，关于接近实在界。它的行动仅是凭借原初的防卫开始发生。接近实在界的这个深奥的模糊暧昧，受到人的要求，它首先被铭记，用防卫的术语。这一种防卫甚至已经存在于压抑的本身的情况被阐述之前。
In order to emphasize what I am calling the paradox of the relationship to
the real in Freud, I will put this on the board - the pleasure principle on the
one hand and reality principle on the other. Once you have been gently reassured
by these two terms, things seem to go along by themselves. Speaking
broadly, one can say that the unconscious is on one side and the conscious
on the other. Please bear that in mind in your attempt to follow the points I
am trying to bring out.
为了强调我正在所谓的在弗洛依德，跟实在界的关系的悖论。我将这个悖论写在黑板上。一方面是快乐原则，另一方面是现实原则。一旦你们已经对这两个术语稍微确定，事情似乎自己会一路前进。广泛地说，我们能够说，一方面是无意识，另一方面是意识。请你们记在心理，当你们企图要遵循我正在揭露的这些要点。
What are we led to articulate the apparatus of perception onto? Onto reality,
of course. Yet, if we follow Freud's hypothesis, on what theoretically is
the control of the pleasure principle exercised? Precisely on perception, and
it is here that one finds the originality of his contribution. The primary process,
as he tells us in the seventh part of the Traumdeutung, tends to be exercised
toward an identity of perception. It doesn't matter whether it is real or
hallucinated, such an identity will always tend to be established. If it isn't
lucky enough to coincide with reality, it will be hallucinated. The risk is in
the possibility of the primary process winning out.
我们被引导要将感知的工具表达成为什么？当然是表达成为现实。可是，假如我们遵循弗洛依德的假设，对于快乐原则的控制理论上要根据什么来运作？确实是根据感知。而且这感知这里，我们发现弗洛依德的贡献的原创性。依照弗洛依德这“梦的解析”的第七部分，原初的过程倾向于被运用，朝向感知的认同。至于感知的认同是真实或是幻觉，并不重要。这样的认同将总是倾向于被建立。假如它没有足够幸运跟现实巧合一致，它将会是幻觉。这个冒险是在逐渐战胜的原初的过程的可能性。
On the other hand, what does the secondary process tend toward? Once
again you should look at Chapter VII, but it is already articulated in the
Enrumrf. It tends toward an identity of thought. What does that mean? It
means that the interior functioning of the psychic apparatus - I will discuss
next time how it might be represented schematically - occurs as a kind of
groping forward, a rectifying test, thanks to which the subject, led on by the
discharges that follow along the Bahnungen already established, will conduct
the series of tests or of detours that will gradually lead him to anastomosis
and to moving beyond the testing of the surrounding system of different
objects present at that moment of its experience. One might say that the
backcloth of experience consists in the construction of a certain system of
Wunsch or of Erwartung of pleasure, defined as anticipated pleasure, and which
tends for this reason to realize itself autonomously in its own sphere, theoretically
without expecting anything from the outside. It moves directly toward
a fulfillment highly antithetical to whatever triggers it.
在另一方面，这个次级过程倾向于什么？再次地，你们应该观看第七章，但是它已经被表达，在“筹划”一书。它倾向于思想的认同。那是什么意思？它的意思是，心灵的工具的内部的功能—下次我将讨论它如何用基模方式来代表—这个功能的发生，作为一种向前模索，一种矫正的测试。由于这个矫正的测试，主体将会主导这一系列的测试或一系列的迂迴。因为它被这些发泄所引导，遵循Bahnungen （方便途径）已经建立的发泄所引导。这一系统的测试或一系列的迂迴逐渐引导他到汇集一块，引导他到移动超越过周围系统的测试，出现在它的经验的那个时刻不同的客体的周围系统。我们可以说，经验的背景主要是在于建立某个愿望的系统，或快乐的期望。它被定义为被预期的快乐。因为这个理由，它倾向于自动自发地实践它自己，在它自己的范围里。理论上，它并没有从外部期望任何东西。它直接地朝向满足前进。这个满足跟任何触发它的东西高度地对立。
In this preliminary approach, thought ought to appear to be on the level
of the reality principle, in the same column as the reality principle. But it is
by no means the case, since as described by Freud, this process is in itself
and by nature unconscious. Understand that unlike that which reaches the
subject in the perceptual order from the outside world, nothing that takes
place at the level of these tests - thanks to which, by means of approximations
in the psyche, the facilitations are realized that enable the subject to
make his action adequate - is perceptible as such. All thought by its very
nature occurs according to unconscious means. It is doubtless not controlled
by the pleasure principle, but it occurs in a space that as an unconscious space
is to be considered as subject to the pleasure principle.
在这个初级的接近实在界，思想应该出现在现实原则的层面，在跟现实相同的栏框。但是它绝非是这个情况，因为依照弗洛依德所描述的，这个过程本身及其本质是无意识。请你们理解，不像从外部世界的感知的秩序到达主体的东西，发生在这些测试的层面的东西，没有一样可依照本身被感知。由于这次测试，凭借心灵的接近，有些方便途径被体会到，让主体能够使他的行动胜任。所有的思想由于它自己的特性，依照无意识而发生。无可置疑地，它并没有受到快乐原则的控制，但是它发生在一个空间。作为无意识的空间，这个空间应该被认为隶属于快乐原则。
Of everything that occurs at the level of inner processes, and thought itself
is such a process, according to Freud, the only signs of which the subject is
consciously aware are signs of pleasure or pain. As with all the other unconscious
processes, nothing else reaches the level of consciousness but those
signs there.
关于每样发生在内部过程的层面的东西，思想本身并不是这样的过程。依照弗洛依德，这个过程的唯一的讯息，主体在意识上是知道。这些讯息是快乐或痛苦的讯息。如同所有的其他无意识的过程，没有别的东西到底意识的层面，除了在那里的那些讯息。
How then do we have some apprehension of those processes of thought?
Here again Freud responds in a fully articulated way - only insofar as words
are uttered. An idea that, with the tendency to facility characteristic of all
thought that in spite of itself is tainted by a kind of parallelism, is commonly
interpreted as follows: "It is, of course, clear that what Freud is telling us
there is that words are that which characterizes the transition into the preconscious."
But the transition of what precisely?
那么我们如何理解思想的这些过程？在此，弗洛依德再次回应，用充分被表达的方式，仅是就文字被表达的方式。一个观念具有方便一切思想的特性的倾向，尽管它的自身沾染一种的并列对比，它通常被解释如下：「当然，显而易见的是，弗洛依德正在告诉我们的东西就是：表现这个转换成为前意识的特性的文字。」但是那确实是什么的转换：
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http://springhero.wordpress.com
> 我来回应